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THE ENFORCIBILITY OF FIXED-TERM




Corporate bylaws commonly confer upon the board of directors the power to
remove corporate officers from their positions without cause.1 It is also fairly
common, however, for corporations to hire officers under fixed-term employment
contracts that make no reference to such bylaw provisions. The situation therefore
can arise where a board of directors that is dissatisfied with the performance of an
officer seeks to terminate his employment under a bylaw provision allowing for
discharge at will, and the officer attempts to invoke the fixed-term employment
provision of his contract to resist dismissal. How is such a dispute to be resolved?
First of all, most American jurisdictions have statutes in effect that reserve for
directors the ultimate authority to dismiss corporate employees at Will.2 Therefore,
as a general matter, a corporate employee can be dismissed regardless of the terms of
his contract. However, these same statutes also generally preserve the right of an
employee to recover damages if his dismissal is done in violation of his contractual
rights.3 An important question is thus squarely presented: Where a corporate
employee has a provision in his contract calling for a specific term of employment,
and this provision conflicts with a bylaw provision not referenced in the contract
which gives the board of directors the power to terminate employees at will, does the
*Professor of Law, Dedman, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
1. Set forth below is a typical bylaw provision to this effect, drawn in this instance from the bylaws of
Snelling & Snelling, Inc., a Delaware corporation:
Removal. Any officer or agent of the Corporation may be removed, with or without cause,
by the Board of Directors whenever in the judgment of the Board the best interests of the
Corporation will be served thereby.
2. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1733 (2000):
Any officer or agent of a business corporation may be removed by the board of directors
with or without cause. The removal shall be without prejudice to the contract rights, if any,
of the person so removed. Election or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself
create contract rights.
3. See, e.g., id. See also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.44(b) (1984), which states in part:
"An officer's removal does not affect the officer's contract rights, if any, with the
corporation."
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employee have a right to damages if he is dismissed?
This question has been litigated fairly extensively for over 100 years across a
number of jurisdictions,4 and the cases are all over the map with regard to their
results and the rationales followed to reach those results. The academic commentary
unfortunately provides little assistance for understanding and resolving the tensions
within this jurisprudence. I am not aware of any serious scholarly attempts to analyze
the problem. All that is available are relatively superficial treatise discussions that do
little more than describe the different positions that have been taken in the cases, and
do not attempt to articulate a coherent theoretical framework for reconciling these
differences.
In my opinion, in the event of such a conflict between express contractual terms
and corporate bylaws the courts should favor the employee and allow the award of
damages for wrongful termination under a wide range of circumstances, including
some situations in which few if any courts have heretofore ruled in favor of the
employee. As I will discuss below, this conclusion is supported both by basic agency
law principles and by its favorable implications for promoting efficient resource
allocation.
THE COMMENTARY AND CASES
Let me begin by demonstrating the ambivalence shown by the most widely
consulted treatises concerning how to characterize the numerous and conflicting
court decisions on this issue. First of all, the well-regarded corporation law treatise
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations5 in its main text takes the
position that the case law authority supports the directors' right to invoke the
applicable bylaw to terminate a corporate officer from a fixed-term employment
contract without liability: "An officer is chargeable with knowledge of its charter and
of its bylaws adopted before his or her appointment, and the tenure of office is
subject to their provisions.",6
4. See, e.g., the following cases (listed in chronological order, most recent cases first): Nelson v. WEB
Water Development Ass'n, Inc-, 507 N.W.2d 691 (S.D. 1993); Short v. Columbus Rubber and Gasket Co.,
Inc., 535 So.2d 61 (Miss.1988); Hernandez v. Banco de las Americas, 571 P.2d 1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976);
Jennings v. Rudioso Racing Ass'n, 441 P.2d 42 (N.M. 1968); Magnus v. Magnus Organ Corp., 177 A.2d 55
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962); Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d. 530 (Tex. App. 1960); Pioneer
Specialties, Inc v. Nelson, 339 S.W.2d. 199 (Tex. 1960); United Producers & Consumers Co-op v. Held, 225
F.2d. 615 (9th Cir. 1955); Cohen v. Camden Refrigerating & Terminals Co., 30 A.2d. 428 (N.J. 1943); Dennis
v. Thermoid Co., 25 A.2d. 886 (NJ. 1942); Hill v. American Co-op. Ass'n, 197 So. 241 (La.1940); In re
Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937);Abberger v. Kulp, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935);
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery 51 F.2d. 636 (3d Cir. 1930); Walker v. Maas & Waldstein Co., 140
A. 286 (NJ. 1927); Walker v. Maas, 132 A. 322 (NJ. 1926); Ginter v. Heco Envelope Co., 147 N.E. 42 (I11.
1925); Millar v. Grieb & Thomas, Inc, 120 A. 390 (Pa. 1923); Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 111 N.E. 249 (N.Y.
1916); Reiss v. Usona Shirt Co., 159 N.Y.S. 1031 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916); Selley v. American Lubricator Co.,
93 N.W. 590 (Iowa 1903); Darrah v. Wheeling Ice & Storage Co., 40 S.E. 373 (NV. Va. 1901); Jones v. Vance
Shoe Co., 92 111. App. 158 (IMI. App. Ct. 1899); Fowler v. Great S. TeL & Tel. Co., 29 So. 271 (La. 1901);
Douglass v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 23 N.E. 806 (N.Y. 1890); Martino v. Commerce Ins. Co., 15 Jones & S 520
(N.Y. 1881); Hunter v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 13 (La. 1874); Queen v. Second Ave., 44 How. Pr. 281
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
5. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER Er AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § XXX (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1998).
6. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 334 at 137.
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However, the head note presented by the Fletcher Cyclopedia summarizing the
first case cited purportedly in support of this proposition articulates exactly the
opposite position: "Notwithstanding contrary provisions in bylaws or articles of
incorporation fixing term of office of employees and officers of company, contract of
employment entered into by board will be upheld, though in contravention
thereof.... ,7
The American Jurisprudence (2d)s treatise more openly acknowledges the split
of judicial authority on this question, and takes a more nuanced position in its
depiction of the major tensions within the case law:
According to some cases, persons who enter the employment of a corporation with
either actual knowledge of the existence of a bylaw authorizing the removal of an
officer, agent, or employee at any time, or with constructive notice of the bylaw by
reason of being a stockholder in, or officer of, the corporation, or otherwise, are
bound by it and must be presumed to have accepted employment subject to, it even
though the employment purports to be for a specified period. In several cases,
however, the mere fact that the bylaws of a corporation authorized the removal of
officers, agents, or employees at any time, has not rendered invalid or unenforceable
a contract of employment made by it for a specified period. A contract of
employment for a specified period may operate as an amendment or rescission of a
bylaw authorizing the removal of an officer or employee at any time, where such
contract was made by a board of directors having power to amend or rescind the
bylaws of the corporation. The contract of employment will not, however, override
the bylaw, unless it fairly appears to have been intended to do so. A contract of
employment for a specified period will not prevail over a bylaw authorizing removal
at pleasure where the board of directors making the contract has no power to amend
or rescind the bylaw (footnotes omitted).9
Finally, a 1943 American Law Reports Annotated Note that dealt specifically
with this question also took the position articulated by the Fletcher Cyclopedia that
the general rule is that such bylaws are incorporated by reference into the
employment contracts, and that corporate employees are therefore subject to
termination without liability at the discretion of the board of directors.10 However,
that Note also recognized in a sub-section titled "Contrary cases; special
circumstances" that: "In several cases, however, the mere fact that the bylaws of a
corporation authorized the removal of officers, agents, or employees at any time has
been held not to render invalid or unenforceable a contract of employment made by
it for a specified period."'"
The ALR Note in another section titled "Exceptions to, and limitations upon,
general rule" also stated that:
7. Id. at n.16 (citing Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930)).
S. American Jurisprudence, Second Edition (1985).
9. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1432 (1985).
10. M.A.L., Annotation, Bylaw of Corporation Authorizing Removal of Officer, Agent, or Employee at
Anytime as Affecting Contract of Employment for a Specified Period, 145 A.L.R. 312 (1943) ("Generally,
corporate bylaws are binding upon all the members of the corporation, as they are presumed to know




A contract for employment for a specified period has been held to operate as an
amendment or rescission of a bylaw authorizing the removal of an officer or
employee at any time, where such contract was made by a board of directors having
12power to amend or rescind the bylaws of the corporation.
As I have noted above, and as the treatises recognize, there has developed a
fairly extensive, but inconsistent case law concerning this issue.13 One line of cases
extending back into the 19th century emphasizes the principle articulated by all of the
treatises quoted above that a person who contracts with a corporation is presumed to
be aware of the corporation's bylaws, and that corporate employment contracts are
therefore best regarded as implicitly incorporating by reference any limitations
imposed by thee bylaws upon the contractual rights expressly conferred.
1 4
A second and somewhat more recent line of cases, however, emphasizes
instead the principle recognized by the AmJur 2d and ALR annotation discussions
quoted above that the corporation's board is presumed to be aware of the
corporation's bylaws, and therefore any contracts the board authorizes that contain
provisions that conflict with its bylaw authority are best regarded as implicitly
repealing those conflicting bylaws, at least for the purpose of the contract at issue.'
5
16By far the best-known of these cases is Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, a
Third Circuit opinion applying Delaware law that has been cited by a number of
subsequent opinions that reached similar results.
17
In Realty Acceptance the corporation's board sought to discharge its President
from his five-year employment contract pursuant to a bylaw provision permitting
removal of officers without cause. The Third Circuit court there ruled in favor of the
officer's claim for damages, stating:
To read into a contract of employment for a definite period, expressly authorized by
the board of directors, a by-law amendable by the majority of the board [allowing
discharge without cause], and thus nullify the contract, would sacrifice substance and
straightforwardness for form and procedure .... I am of the opinion and find that
the contract made by the defendant pursuant to the express authority of its board of
directors, which had express power to amend at will the by-laws of the defendant,
modified, in its legal effect, all inconsistent by-laws and prevails over them.i
s
A sub-theme also developed by some opinions that lie within this second line of
12. Id. at 316-17.
13. See Fletcher Cyclopedia, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g.,Jones, 92 Ill. App. 158; Selley, 93 N.W. 590; Hunter, 26 La.13; New Jersey ex rel. Walker, 132
A. 322; Walker, 140 A. 286; Cohen, 30 A.2d 428; Douglass, 23 N.E. 806; Queen, 44 How. Pr. 281; Abberger,
281 N.Y.S. 373; Darrah, 40 S.E. 373.
15. See, e.g., Nelson, 507 N.W.2d 691; Short, 535 So. 2d 61; Bossier v. Connell, No. CIV. A. 8624, 1986
Del. Ch. LEXIS 511 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1986); Hernandez, 571 P.2d 1033; Jennings, 441 P.2d 42; Magnus,
177 A.2d 55; Dixie Glass Co., 341 S.W.2d 530; United Producers & Consumers Co-op, 225 F.2d 615; Dennis,
25 A.2d 886; Hill 197 So. 241; In Re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441; Realty Acceptance Corp., 51 F.2d
636; Cuppy, 111 N.E. 249.
16. 51 F.2d. 636 (3d Cir. 1930).
17. See, e.g., Nelson, 507 N.W.2d 691; Short, 535 So.2d 61; Bossier, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 511;
Hernandez, 571 P.2d 1033; Hill, 197 So. 241; Jennings, 441 P.2d 42; Keating v. K-C-K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Magnus, 177 A.2d 55.
18. 51 F.2d at 639.
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cases is the limitation of the "implicit bylaw repeal" principle to instances where the
bylaw is one that is within the authority of the board of directors to repeal, rather
than one requiring a shareholder vote to amend or rescind 9
DISCUSSION
The situation considered in this article can really only arise where the conflict
between the fixed term of the employment contract and the removal-at-will bylaw
provision is not addressed either in the original contract negotiations between the
corporate officer and the corporation's agents negotiating the contract on its behalf,
or at the subsequent board of directors meeting by which the board ratifies the
contract. In other words, the conflict almost by definition occurs only in situations
where neither the officer nor the board becomes aware of the problem until dismissal
is sought. Who is at fault here for overlooking this clash, and what implications
should this culpability have for the resolution of the conflict?
One line of the cases takes as its central premise the view that the officer is the
culpable party. He "should have known" of the bylaw provision when contracting
with the corporation, and therefore his contract rights are subordinated to that
provision. The other line of cases essentially rests upon the idea that the board of
directors is the one that "should have known" about their bylaw, and thus has
implicitly rescinded the applicable bylaw provision by agreeing to a contract with
fixed-term employment provisions. Which of these lines of authority reflects the
better view, and why?
The choice here can be clarified and illuminated if one first considers how basic
principles of agency law apply to the situation. The board of directors of a
corporation acts as an agent on behalf of its principal, the corporation. Under well-
established legal doctrines agents can contractually obligate their principals by
entering into contracts on their behalf within the scope of their agency authority.20
The source of that authority can be either the actual authority conferred upon the
agent by the principal 21 apparent authority based upon representations made to that
effect by the principal to third parties,22 or inherent authority based upon the
reasonable expectations that third persons have concerning the scope of authority
conferred upon the agent in connection with his discharge of conventional agency
roles.23
In most instances the board of directors of a corporation has the actual
authority to amend or rescind all bylaw provisions except for those concerning core
shareholder protections. This is so because in most jurisdictions the shareholders of
corporations are left free under the applicable statutes to confer upon directors broad
authority to amend, rescind or waive the bylaws concerning routine corporate
operations, such as the bylaws conferring the right to terminate the employment of
19. See, e.g., Fowler v. Great Southern TeL & TeL Co., 29 So. 271,272 (La. 1900).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §144 (1993).
21. Id. §§ 7, 144.
22. Id. §§ 8, 159.
23. Id. § 8A.
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officers or other agents without cause 2 4 and most corporate articles of incorporation
do confer that authority upon the board. Under these circumstances the only
question arising under agency law in this context is whether the board should be
deemed to have implicitly exercised this authority to waive or repeal a conflicting
bylaw when it enters into a fixed-term employment contract.
I believe that economic efficiency concerns strongly support the "implicit bylaw
repeal" position. There is an obvious parallel here with many other kinds of
contractual disputes that arise from the parties' failure to allocate the risk of a mutual
mistake or of an unforeseen post-contractual contingency. There is now a very
substantial collection of literature in support of filling such a contractual gap with an
allocation of the risk of such an event to the party who would have been
contractually allocated the risk had the parties foreseen the possibility and placed the
risk on the party best able to prevent or insure against it, accompanied by the
appropriate side payments needed to distribute the benefits of the efficient allocation
of this particular risk in accordance with the relative bargaining power of the
parties.5 Such a default rule of risk allocation creates the economically efficient ex
ante incentive structure for guiding parties' decisions as to the degree of detail to
26which they will specify their obligations with regard to more remote contingencies.
The frequently recurring problem with the application of this hypothetical
bargain risk allocation principle is that it is often unclear which of the parties to a
dispute was the preferred ex ante risk bearer with regard to the risk at issue.27
However, in the corporate employment contract context the appropriate risk
allocation seems unusually clear. The board of directors of a corporation is generally
in a better position to take account of the corporation's bylaws when negotiating
employment contracts-particularly those bylaws that relate to the board's core
authority to make top-level personnel decisions-than are potential corporate
employees. The board is certainly in at least as good a position to be aware of these
bylaws as are even those bylaw-conscious existing senior corporate employees who
are negotiating new contracts. The efficient allocation of the risk of unforeseen
conflicts between contract terms and bylaw provisions will place the burden of an
adverse resolution of such conflicts upon the board of directors, which is in the best
position to become aware of this potential problem and prevent it from arising.
Efficiency considerations thus call for Realty Acceptance-style "implied bylaw repeal"
24. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1504(a) (West 1995) (allowing the shareholders to vest in the
board of directors the authority to adopt, amend or repeal all bylaw provisions except for those provisions
listed in § 1504(b) as addressing shareholder protection concerns).
25. "The task for a court asked to interpret a contract to cover a contingency that the parties did not
provide for is to imagine how the parties would have provided for the contingency if they had decided to do
so." RiCHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 104-05 (5th Ed. 1998). See also Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ.
87, 89-90 (1989); FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMic STRucruRE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991).
26. RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 104 (1998).
27. "In many... cases economic analysis-at least of the casual sort employed by the judges and
lawyers in contract cases-will fail to yield a definite answer, or even a guess, as to which party is the
superior risk bearer." Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83,110 (1977).
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rulings awarding damages for violation of fixed-term employment provisions.
I therefore recommend, on agency law and economic efficiency grounds, that
courts embrace the "implied bylaw repeal" resolution of these contract-bylaw
conflicts in favor of the corporation employee by ruling that corporation attempts to
invoke those bylaw provisions, while generally effective to obtain dismissal under the
applicable statutes, constitute a breach of the employment contract entitling the
employee to appropriate damages. I oppose, however, limiting the application of
that doctrine to those instances where the board of directors has the formal authority
to amend or rescind the bylaw at issue, as some of the courts that have embraced the
"implied bylaw repeal" doctrine have done in a rather superficial and uncritical
fashion.28
My second conclusion here concerning the appropriate scope of this doctrine is
also derived from agency law principles. As discussed above, boards of directors
generally have the actual authority under their articles of incorporation to amend or
rescind those bylaws relating to routine corporate operations. Given this fact, when
dealing with boards of directors persons generally assume, without making further
inquiry, those boards have the authority to explicitly or implicitly amend the bylaws
as necessary to conform with corporation contractual commitments, except perhaps
for those bylaws concerning core shareholder protections.
The doctrine of inherent authority is an elaboration of general estoppel
principles that is designed to protect the reasonable (though incorrect) expectations
of persons who deal with an agent as to the scope of the agent's authority, under
circumstances such as those here considered where those incorrect expectations arise
from conventional understandings of agency roles, rather than from representations
made by the principal. It is reasonable for persons entering into an employment
contract with a corporation to assume that the board of directors, in ratifying the
contract, has explicitly or implicitly repealed or waived any conflicting bylaws.
Therefore, even in those relatively infrequent instances where the board of directors
in fact lacks the actual authority to amend a bylaw provision relating to employment
termination, and where no representations of such board authority that would create
apparent authority have been made by the corporation, there still appears to be a
sufficient "inherent authority" basis for estopping the corporation from invoking the
bylaw to avoid liability for violating a fixed-term employment contract as a result of
the board's (formally unauthorized) attempt to implicitly repeal such a bylaw
through ratification of a fixed-term employment contract.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that where the board of
directors of a corporation attempts to invoke a bylaw provision allowing termination
at will to discharge a corporate employee from a fixed-term employment contract,
such an act should be regarded as a breach of the employment contract entitling the
employee to appropriate damages, even in those instances where the board lacks the
28. See, e-g., Realty Acceptance, 51 F.2d at 639; Fowler, 29 So. at 272.
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authority under the applicable articles of incorporation to amend or rescind the
bylaw at issue.
The agency law and economic efficiency rationales underlying this conclusion
are quite robust, and in my opinion also adequately support the general application
of the "implied bylaw repeal" principle to protect other employee rights arising from
the terms of employment contracts-such as, for example, commitments to fixed
employee duties-that may conflict with other bylaw provisions conferring
unrestricted discretion upon the board of directors. It should also for the same
reasons be applied broadly to resolve similar conflicts that can arise between the
terms of employment agreements and the internal governance rules in force for other
types of business entities, such as partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited
liability companies.
